---
title: "theAuth threat model: boundaries, scope, catalog"
description: "A summary of the theauth-go threat model: STRIDE method, trust boundaries, what is in scope, what operators own, and how the threat catalog is organized."
canonical: https://theauth.dev/open/threat-model/
lastmod: 2026-10-31
---

Threat model

# Threats, scoped honestly

The Go threat model uses STRIDE and covers the library as deployed by an operator in a Go HTTP application. It is a design document, not an audit report or a certification. The document states it was last reviewed against v2.7.0.

[Read the threat model](https://docs.theauth.dev/go/security/threat-model) [Disclosure policy](https://theauth.dev/security/)

## Sources and review date

**Source**Last reviewed 2026-10-06

Trust boundaries

## Where data crosses a line

The document lists seven boundaries. Each is analyzed per component with a mitigation and a residual risk.

Trust boundaries in the Go threat model

| Boundary | What crosses it | Direction |
| --- | --- | --- |
| HTTP network | OAuth and OIDC protocol messages: authorize, token, introspect, JWKS | Inbound |
| HTTP network | Provider OAuth callbacks (GitHub, Google, Apple and others) | Inbound |
| Process and database | SQL queries and responses | Both ways |
| Process and SIEM | Audit events forwarded to OTLP, Splunk or webhook sinks | Outbound |
| Process and email | Magic link and password reset emails | Outbound |
| HTTPS to identity providers | Client identity metadata document fetches | Outbound, HTTPS only |
| Process memory | Ed25519 signing keys | In process only |

Scope

## What is analyzed

Components in scope, per the document:

- Token issuingThe authorization server (authorization code, refresh token, client credentials and token exchange grants) and the resource server validator in mcpresource.
- PersistenceMemory, Postgres, MySQL and SQLite storage backends behind the Storage interface.
- Sign-in flowsPassword, social OAuth, magic link, WebAuthn, TOTP, SAML and SCIM.
- Supporting systemsAudit subsystem, sessions, agent identity, delegation chains, client identity metadata documents and RBAC.

## Out of scope: the operator owns these

- **TLS termination and certificates.** The library warns at startup when cookies are not Secure over non-https, but cannot enforce transport security.
- **Secrets at rest.** Encryption keys are supplied by the operator. The library has no secret store.
- **Infrastructure isolation.** Containers, VMs, Kubernetes policies and kernel security modules.
- **Authentication device security.** A compromised TOTP app, stolen WebAuthn key or compromised phone.
- **Network-layer flood protection.** The library provides application-layer limits, not TCP or UDP flood defense.
- **Runtime side channels.** Constant-time comparisons are used, but Go runtime behavior cannot be guaranteed.

- TokensBearer theft and replay, replay across resources, PKCE downgrade, refresh token replay, JWKS rotation races.
- AuthorizationCode injection, open redirect, CSRF on authorize, delegation scope escalation.
- Sessions and sign-inSession fixation, cookie theft, provider OAuth state CSRF, MFA bypass on identity merge, WebAuthn replay, SAML signature wrapping.
- OperationsAudit log tampering, client authentication cache poisoning, SCIM token reuse, webhook signature forgery, client identity trust policy.

Catalog

## Numbered threats with a status each

The catalog is a table of numbered entries (T-01 onward). Each has a status, such as mitigated, partially mitigated, or operator responsibility. High-level groups:

Reading it

## Some mitigations are opt-in

A mitigation can depend on a setting. For example, requiring state on /authorize is off by default and should be enabled in production, as the [security page](https://theauth.dev/security/) also says.

The per-component sections give each threat a mitigation and a residual risk, so you can see what you must configure yourself. The full catalog, including every status, is in [threat model](https://docs.theauth.dev/go/security/threat-model). Read it rather than this summary when you assess a deployment.

To report a vulnerability, use the process on [the security page](https://theauth.dev/security/).

## Related pages

- [Roadmap](https://theauth.dev/open/roadmap/)
- [Stability](https://theauth.dev/open/stability/)
- [Governance](https://theauth.dev/open/governance/)
- [Releases](https://theauth.dev/open/releases/)
- [Compliance](https://theauth.dev/open/compliance/)
- [Open hub](https://theauth.dev/open/)
- [Security and disclosure](https://theauth.dev/security/)
